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POLICE BAIL WITHOUT CHARGE: THE HUMAN
RIGHTS IMPLICATIONS
ED CAPE AND RICHARD A. EDWARDS*
Whilst the power of the police to release a person on bail prior to trial has
existed for centuries, the power to release on bail a person suspected of but
not charged with a criminal offence has been available to the police only since
1925. The power to attach conditions to pre-charge bail is of very recent
origin, having been introduced for the first time in 2003 but rapidly expanded
since then. Whilst imposing restrictions on the liberty of a person should,
constitutionally, be reserved to the judiciary, the fact that it was originally
conceived, in part at least, as a mechanism for enhancing liberty reduced the
constitutional tension created by allowing members of the executive such
powers. However, the changing role of arrest in the investigation of crime
and the granting of extensive powers to the police to impose bail conditions
means that the police now have the ability to place controls on people not
charged with a criminal offence for extended periods of time. It is argued here
that this is in breach of the right to liberty under Article 5 of the European
Convention on Human Rights and, in practice, may also breach other
Convention rights.
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INTRODUCTION
OVER the past decade the powers of the police to subject a person, who
has been arrested but not charged with a criminal offence, to bail with
conditions attached have dramatically increased. Although statistics
are not routinely collected, it is likely that thousands of people each
year are subjected to conditions that may range from non-association
with specified people, or not going to specified locations, to residing at
a particular address and abiding by a curfew. Such conditions may be
imposed for lengthy periods of time, and whilst the conditions them-
selves may be reviewed by a court, in practice the decision to “impose”
bail cannot. It is worth emphasising from the outset that such con-
ditional bail may be imposed on a person even though there is in-
sufficient evidence to charge them with a criminal offence. All that is
required is that the person has been arrested.
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Whilst these powers has occasionally caught the attention of the
media,1 they have otherwise received very little attention.2 Although the
powers pose a significant challenge to well entrenched constitutional
and human rights, for the most part they have been considered only in
terms of whether they serve the interests of efficient police investi-
gation. When considering the introduction of powers to attach condi-
tions to bail granted to a person immediately after their arrest (street
bail), the Joint Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights concluded
that they did not give rise to significant incompatibility with the
European Convention on Human rights (ECHR).3 The few decisions of
the courts on pre-charge police bail have either not considered or given
short shrift to human rights concerns.4 The powers have similarly
attracted little interest from the legal profession or academics.5
In view of the significance of the powers under scrutiny, we
begin with a detailed account of police powers to grant bail, tracing
their development from the introduction of “modern” policing in the
nineteenth century to the present day. This account demonstrates that
powers that were originally introduced as a mechanism that potentially
enhanced the liberty of those arrested by the police have been trans-
formed, as a result of the changing role of the police in the investigation
of crime and the introduction of powers to attach conditions to bail,
into a mechanism that threatens the liberty of those who are subjected
to them. We go on to examine these powers by reference, in particular,
to the right to liberty under Article 5 ECHR. We also, all too briefly,
consider the implications of such powers for other rights under the
Convention, in particular the right to private life (Article 8), the right
to freedom of expression (Article 10), and the right to freedom of
assembly and association (Article 11), and for the presumption of
innocence (Article 6(2)).
1 For example, “Lawyers to fight bail conditions that “stifle” climate protests”, guardian.co.uk,
3 May 2009; “Didcot demonstrators: Police use bail restrictions to stifle climate protests”,
guardian.co.uk, 27 October 2009.
2 A notable exception were the proposed changes to the law relating to police bail conditions made
by the Liberal Democrats. See HL Deb. vol. 713 col. 579 (20 October 2009).
3 Joint Committee on Human Rights, Second Report on the Criminal Justice Bill, HL (2002–02) 40.
4 R(C) v. Chief Constable of A and A Magistrates’ Court [2006] EWHC 2352 (Admin); R (Ajaib) v.
Birmingham Magistrates’ Court [2009] EWHC 2127 (Admin).
5 See J. Raine and M. Wilson, “Police Bail with Conditions: Perspectives on the Use, Misuse
and Consequences of a New Police Power” (1997) 37 British Journal of Criminology 593, and
A. Hucklesby, “Police Bail and the Use of Conditions” (2001) Criminology and Criminal Justice
44, although both concern bail granted after charge. Ben Newton, in his chapter “Bail”, in
M. Colvin and J. Cooper, Human Rights in the Investigation and Prosecution of Crime (Oxford
University Press, 2009), briefly considers the human rights implications of street bail but, although
critical, does not pursue his analysis. Stefan Trechsel, in his otherwise comprehensive workHuman
Rights in Criminal Proceedings (Oxford University Press, 2005) does not consider police bail, and it
is not considered in B. Emmerson, A. Ashworth and A. Macdonald, Human Rights and Criminal
Justice (2nd ed. Sweet and Maxwell, 2007) nor in K. Ewing Bonfire of the Liberties: New Labour,
Human Rights, and the Rule of Law (Oxford University Press, 2010).
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We acknowledge that police bail powers also raise constitutional
issues that we do not have space to consider. Although the police and
their forerunners have had certain bail powers for centuries, there is at
least a tension with the general principle that under the doctrine of the
separation of powers such powers are essentially the preserve of the
judiciary.6 Further, an examination of the development of police bail
powers in the context of the “drift to summary justice”, which has been
identified and explored by a number of scholars, is beyond the scope
of the article.7 Nevertheless, we hope that we have done enough
to illuminate an area that ought to demand wider scrutiny and close
attention.
I. POLICE BAIL PRIOR TO THE POLICE AND CRIMINAL EVIDENCE
ACT 1984
In English law the grant of bail has never been an exclusively judicial
activity, and since the advent of “modern” policing in the nineteenth
century, alongside judicial bail there has always been a form of statu-
tory bail8 available to the police;9 since the Metropolitan Police Act
1829 police constables have been able to grant bail in one form or
another.10 This state of affairs appears not to have been the conse-
quence of any deliberate decision. Rather the empowerment of the
police was more a consequence of the chaotic circumstances that sur-
rounded the establishment of the Metropolitan Police. Parliament
granted that power to the new police no doubt because their pre-
decessors had taken bail, but it sought to regulate what was undoubt-
edly an entrenched practice.11 The power to grant bail was seen as
6 State of Mauritius v. Khoyratty [2006] UKPC 13; [2007] 1 A.C. 80.
7 See, for example, R. Young, “Street Policing after PACE: The Drift to Summary Justice” in
E. Cape and R. Young (eds.), Regulating Policing: The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984
Past, Present and Future (Hart 2008), ch. 7, and R. Morgan, Summary Justice: Fast – but Fair?
(Centre for Crime and Justice Studies, 2008).
8 The police have no common law power to grant bail. SeeWilliamson v.Chief Constable of theWest
Midlands [2003] EWCA Civ 337, (2003) 167 J.P. 181 at 192 [20] (Dyson LJ).
9 Notwithstanding the contemporary centrality of police bail to the functioning of policing the
historic roots of this power, essential for determining its proper ambit, have attracted very little
detailed attention.
10 See Metropolitan Police Act, 1829, s. 9; Metropolitan Police Act, 1839, ss. 70–72; Metropolitan
Police Courts Act, 1840, s. 8; Metropolitan Police Act 1864, s. 2 (an Act passed to deal with anti-
social street musicians); Town Police Clauses Act 1847, ss. 17–19; Summary Jurisdiction Act 1879,
s. 38 (extending police bail to felonies in certain cases and amended by later Acts); Municipal
Corporations Act, 1882, s. 227 (borough police empowered to grant bail); Criminal Justice
Administration Act 1914, s. 22; Criminal Justice Act 1925, s. 45 (pre-charge bail); Magistrates Act
1952, s. 38 (consolidating and re-enacting previous provisions); and Magistrates Act 1980, s. 43.
11 Even before the establishment of the Metropolitan police their forerunners were taking bail. The
1828 Select Committee on the Police of the Metropolis recorded in evidence that some Substitute-
Constables were in the habit of taking bail from some defendants, particularly undergraduates at
universities who had a propensity towards drink and violence. Bail taken in such circumstances, it
seems, formed part of their remuneration, which is not altogether surprising as the police were
largely unpaid. See the “Report from the Select Committee on the Police of the Metropolis” 1828
(533) Parliamentary Papers (1828) evidence of J S Thomas, 14th March 1828, K4 79. No doubt for
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useful for reasons of operational efficiency, if not practical justice.
When the courts were not open the power to bail enabled the police to
clear the watch-house of those accused of misdemeanors, frequently no
more than the local drunks.
From the outset of modern policing the separation of powers
between the police and the courts was somewhat blurred, and bail was
not unique in this respect.12 This jurisdictional muddle was initially
a matter of concern to Parliament, with the quasi-judicial powers of
the police causing some anxiety.13 However, during the 1830s these
concerns were examined and largely dismissed as the police became
established and were recognised as a significant improvement on their
disorganised and unprofessional predecessors. Police power to grant
bail only applied in respect of petty misdemeanors, although many
saw advantages in the police being able to liberate those considered
respectable who otherwise would have to be detained in the station
pending the next sitting of the magistrates.14 The 1829 Act was limited,
empowering the police to grant bail only to those detained in a watch-
house at night on condition that they appear at a magistrates’ court on
the following day it sat.15 However, if a person was brought to the
watch-house during the day or on a Sunday the police had no power to
bail them. In 1837 the Metropolitan Police Commissioners reported to
a House of Commons Select Committee that this lacuna was causing
practical difficulty, particularly at Christmas when police stations
would rapidly fill with drunks who remained there for some days until
the courts resumed business.16 Subsequently, the Select Committee re-
commended that the police power to grant bail be widened to prevent
unnecessary detention in police stations.17 Indeed, some even advocated
the extension of the power to bail to cases where felonies were alleged,18
and sure enough the power of the police to bail was gradually extended
to include felonies as well.19 Thus by the end of the nineteenth century
bail was firmly entrenched in the panoply of police powers.20 Whilst the
this very reason Metropolitan Police Act 1829, s. 9, prohibited constables from taking “any fee or
reward” for granting bail.
12 The issue of warrants was another area where the separation of powers was blurred, much to the
concern of the magistrates.
13 Sir Leon Radzinowicz,History of English Criminal Law and its Administration Since 1750, Volume
Four Grappling for Control (Stevens and Sons, 1968), pp. 193–194.
14 In these circumstances the Secretary of State intervened to admit those detained to bail.
15 C. Petersdorf, A Practical Treatise on the Law of Bail (Butterworths 1824), pp. 502–503.
16 Report from Select Committee on Metropolis Police Offices 1837–38 (578) Parl Papers (1837–
1838) 33.
17 Select Committee Report (note 16 above) Recommendation No 11 p. 34.
18 Select Committee Report (note 16 above) evidence of James Traill, magistrate, 37 Evidence.
However, an earlier House of Commons select committee report in 1833 had argued that such an
extension was not necessary.
19 Summary Jurisdiction Act 1879, s. 38.
20 The full extent of the powers is summarised very helpfully in the Report of the Royal Commission
upon the duties of the Metropolitan Police, 1908 Cd. 4156 [42]–[43].
532 The Cambridge Law Journal [2010]
admission to bail has traditionally been considered a judicial function,
in the case of police bail it seems to have been accepted, somewhat
anomalously, that this was an executive function that was satisfactorily
discharged by them for good practical reasons.21
Until 1925 police bail was available only after the police had
decided to charge a suspect. In general a suspect would be charged by
the station officer and then, if not held in custody, would be bailed,
with or without a recognizance, to appear at the next court sitting.
However, under the Criminal Justice Act 1925 the power of the police
to bail a suspect before charge was made available. Paradoxically,
given subsequent developments, when first enacted the power to release
suspects before charge was seen as a necessary safeguard against police
high-handedness and abuse. The change in the law arose from a now
largely forgotten episode involving a decorated war veteran, Major
Sheppard, who had been accused of theft by a prostitute. Sheppard was
detained and interviewed in flagrant breach of the Judges’ Rules and,
no doubt because of his social standing, a statutory inquiry was or-
dered by the Home Secretary.22 The Rawlinson Inquiry concluded that
Major Sheppard had not been promptly granted bail: “The real prin-
ciple underlying the whole matter is that every person in custody who
can safely be bailed has a right to be bailed at the earliest possible
moment. It is vital that the police should bear this principle in mind. It
was absolutely lost sight of in Major Sheppard’s case”.23 Rawlinson
recommended that an amendment be added to the Criminal Justice Bill
then before Parliament to enable pre-charge bail to be granted by the
police.24 Introducing the amendment in the House of Lords the Lord
Chancellor, Lord Cave, argued that the change would benefit both the
police and the suspect.25 The measure was intended to ensure that in-
dividuals were not inconvenienced while, as in Major Sheppard’s case,
the threads of the inquiry were drawn together. In fact, The Law Times
argued that the provision was to be seen in the same class as the Habeas
Corpus Act as a safeguard of liberty and freedom.26
In 1929 the Royal Commission on Police Powers and Procedure
reviewed the treatment of detainees in police custody, in part because
of concerns about police abuse such as in the Sheppard case.27
21 Report (note 20 above), p. 75 [12] and [14].
22 C. Emsley, The Great British Bobby (London 2009), 208.
23 Report of an inquiry held by the Right Hon. J.F.P. Rawlinson, K.C., M.P., into the arrest of Major
R.O. Sheppard (HMSO 1924–25), Cmd. 2497 p. 6.
24 Note 23 above, p. 5.
25 HL Deb. vol. 65 col. 263 (9 December 1925).
26 The Law Times, 12th September 1925 vol. 160, p. 189.
27 1928–29 Cmd. 3297. For another example of custodial abuse see Report of the Tribunal appointed
under the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act, 1921, in regard to the interrogation of Miss Savidge
by the Police 1928, Cmd. 3147. This inquiry led to important changes in the way that female
suspects were interviewed.
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Although the power to release suspects on pre-charge bail had only
recently been enacted the Commission considered its use an integral
part of best practice.28 The “delayed charge” was a valuable power that
should be used as “freely” as possible.29 As well as echoing the pre-
viously stated rationales for this power, the Commission argued that
for the suspect it meant that he could be released pending further in-
quires without the stigma of a court appearance. The provisions
thereafter became an accepted police power, and were consolidated and
re-enacted in s. 38 of the Magistrates Act 1952.
Thus by 1925 the police had extensive powers to grant bail, both
before and following charge. How, then was the power used in prac-
tice? Although there is scant official evidence,30 what evidence is avail-
able shows that in practice it slowly became not a safeguard for the
liberty of the individual, but a tool of police investigatory convenience
if not abuse. Bottomley and Pease, for instance, observed that by the
1980s police bail was used as a sifting procedure to select those people
whom the police wanted to prosecute. Research conducted for the
Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure, which reported in 1981,
demonstrated that a third of all suspects who were not brought before a
court had been initially bailed by the police.31
Police bail is a classic example of a low level broad discretionary
power which is largely uncontrolled. That it has been abused is, there-
fore, hardly surprising. In something of a cause ce´le`bre Mandy Rice-
Davies was arrested on what Bowes and Street agree was an irrelevant
charge and then released on police bail of £1,000.32 This was done, it
seems, solely to ensure her attendance as a witness at the trial of
Stephen Ward. This high profile case resulted in questions in the House
of Commons and censorious coverage by newspapers, although neither
the Attorney General nor the Home Secretary were prepared to admit
there was any impropriety.
However, abuse was not limited to such high profile cases. In 1970
the Cobden Trust reported in its widely cited study Bail or Custody33
28 Royal Commission on Police Powers and Procedures (1928–29) Cmd. 3297, ch. 5.
29 Note 28 above, [143]. The Commission thought that power was inappropriate in cases where the
suspect was arrested on suspicion of having committed a serious offence, or where the suspect was
of no fixed abode.
30 K. Bottomley and K. Pease, Crime and Punishment: Interpreting the Data (Milton Keynes 1986),
p. 66.
31 R. Gemmill and R. Morgan-Giles, Arrest, Charge and Summons Research Study No. 9 (HMSO
1980) 21, Table 3.7, cited in Bottomley and Pease (note 30 above), 66. Between 8 and 17% of those
in police custody were bailed under s. 38(2) for further inquires. A similar figure was later found by
the Home Office Research Study No 185 Entry into the criminal justice system: a survey of police
arrests and their outcomes by C. Phillips and D. Brown, 82. However, 44% of bailed suspects had
no further action taken against them, 83.
32 H. Street Freedom, the Individual and the Law (Harmondsworth 1967), pp. 26–27. A full account of
the abuse of police bail in the case of Mandy Rice-Davies can be read in S. Bowes, The Police and
Civil Liberties (London 1966), pp. 146–147.
33 M King, Bail or Custody (London 1971).
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that the police were engaging in “bail bargaining”, a process whereby
bail was used to entice the suspect into making incriminating state-
ments.34 This unlawful practice had surfaced in R v Zaveckas35 in which
the Court of Appeal quashed a conviction based on a confession
elicited from the defendant with the promise of bail. However, it was
rare for such practices to come to light because, as the authors of the
Cobden study noted, “it is extremely difficult to corroborate accounts
by defendants of what went on behind closed doors of the police sta-
tion”.36 Furthermore, both the Cobden study and an earlier Home
Office Study37 revealed that the initial decision of the police could have
adverse consequences for the suspect later in the criminal justice sys-
tem. For instance, there was a strong correlation between the initial
police decision to grant or withhold bail, and the subsequent decisions
of magistrates. Suspects who were granted police bail on condition that
they appear in court were further remanded on bail by magistrates’
courts in ninety two per cent of cases.38 The Cobden Trust argued
not only that the police were, in effect, acting as judges in their own
cause when granting bail but also that well-defined restrictions were
needed on the power to grant bail.39 Nonetheless, these concerns were
dismissed by the Working Party on Bail Procedures in Magistrates’
Courts.40 The police would retain their “substantial discretionary
powers”41 that had such an influence on the subsequent decisions of
courts with respect to bail.42
II. POLICE BAIL FOLLOWING THE POLICE AND CRIMINAL EVIDENCE
ACT 1984
The Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) 1984 is commonly
regarded as marking a significant change in the approach to the regu-
lation of police powers, particularly those at the investigative stage
of the criminal process.43 Many of its provisions were based on
recommendations of the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure
(the Philips Commission), which reported in 1981.44 However, police
34 Note 33 above, p. 8.
35 [1970] 1 All E.R. 413.
36 Note 31 above, p. 6.
37 Home Office Research Unit, The Use of Bail and Custody by London Magistrates Courts Before
and After the Criminal Justice Act 1967, Report No 20 (HMSO 1974), p. 15.
38 Note 37 above, p. 8.
39 Note 33 above, p. 8.
40 Report of the Working Party on Bail Procedures in Magistrates’ Courts (HMSO 1974), 179–180.
41 D. Galligan, “The Working paper on Bail” (1975) 38 MLR 59, 63.
42 K. Bottomley, Decisions in the Penal Process (London 1973), pp. 87–88.
43 For a comprehensive treatment see M. Zander, The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (5th ed.,
Londonl 2005), and for a critical analysis of the impact of PACE 1984 see E. Cape and R. Young
(eds.), Regulating Policing: The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 Past, Present and Future
(Oxford 2008).
44 RCCP, Report, Cmnd. 8092 (HMSO 1981).
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bail was treated by the Philips Commission as being largely un-
controversial.45 Despite the disquiet that had been voiced in the 1970s,
the only major concern expressed in evidence to the Commission was,
as identified by the Cobden Trust a decade earlier, the danger of con-
fessions being induced by the offer or perceived offer of bail.46 The only
recommendation by the Commission in respect of pre-charge bail was
that the police should have the power to re-bail a person who had
surrendered following the earlier grant of police bail.47
As originally enacted, a number of provisions of the PACE 1984
permitted the police to bail a person without having charged them with
an offence. Section 34(5) allowed a custody officer to grant bail to a
person they were required to release under s. 34(2) because the grounds
for detention had ceased to apply and there were no other grounds
justifying their detention. Section 37(2) permitted the custody officer to
release a person on bail where, having been arrested and brought to the
police station, the officer did not have sufficient evidence to charge
them with the offence for which they had been arrested. Section
37(7)(b) enabled a custody officer, having determined that there was
sufficient evidence to charge, to release a person on bail as an alterna-
tive to charging them. This was in addition to the power of the custody
officer to release a person charged with a criminal offence on bail
pending their first court appearance.48 However, in none of these in-
stances were the police permitted to impose conditions. In view of the
subsequent introduction of “street bail”, it is worth noting that the
power to bail an arrested person without taking them to a police station
was not considered by the Philips Commission, and did not feature in
the PACE 1984 as originally enacted.
The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice (the Runciman
Commission), reporting in 1993, went a step further than the Philips
Commission by recommending that the police should have the
power to impose conditions on granting bail, both where the suspect
was released without charge and following charge. Allowing the police
to impose conditions prior to charge “should lead to more thorough
investigations”; and post-charge it “would reduce the suspect’s liability
to attend court”. It would also mean that where a decision was made
not to charge or to prosecute, the person would “be able to avoid a
45 This is despite the fact that research that it had commission found evidence of such use. See P.
Softley, Police Interrogation: An Observational Study in Four Police Stations, Research Study No 4
(HMSO 1980).
46 Above note 42, p. 58.
47 In respect of post-charge bail, the Commission recommended that the police should have the
power to impose conditions.
48 Section 38 permitted the custody officer to withhold bail on a number of grounds, which originally
did not include fear of offences being committed although this was subsequently added. Apart
from adding powers to impose conditions, the bail powers referred to have remained substantially
the same.
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court appearance and any attendant publicity altogether”.49 Like the
Philips Commission, the Runciman Commission gave no consideration
to the problems that might arise from extending police bail powers in
this way even though research it had itself commissioned found that
the police “were sometimes prepared to use their discretion over bail”
as a tactic to induce a suspect to talk or to confess.50 The Runciman
Commission’s recommendation was partially implemented by the
Criminal Justice and Public Order Act (CJPOA) 1994, s. 27(2)(a),
which amended the Bail Act 1976, s. 3 and the PACE 1984, s. 47,
to permit a security or surety to be required, and/or conditions to be
imposed, where a person was granted bail following charge under the
PACE 1984, s. 38(1).
For almost the next decade there were no significant changes to
police bail powers. The Law Commission published a consultation
paper on bail in 199951 and published a final report, Bail and the Human
Rights Act 1998, in 2001.52 Whilst the Commission considered police
powers to grant or withhold bail post-charge, most of the report con-
cerned bail from a court, and it specifically excluded consideration of
police bail in respect of a person who had not been charged.
The next major statutory development was the Criminal Justice Act
(CJA) 2003, which introduced the concept of street bail. This was pre-
figured by the government white paper Justice for All, published in
2002,53 which in the then fashionable vernacular described the govern-
ment’s aim as being “to rebalance the system in favour of victims,
witnesses and communities and to deliver justice for all, by building
greater trust and credibility”. Detailed consideration of changes to the
PACE 1984 was left to the review of the legislation established by the
then Home Secretary (the Joint Review),54 but the government was
concerned to identify changes that “could simplify police procedures,
reduce administrative burdens, save police resources and speed up the
process of justice”.55 In this context the white paper raised the question
whether it was essential that all arrested persons be taken to a police
station “for processing and interviewing”, or whether some of them
could be dealt with away from the police station, “thus saving
police time”. It no doubt had in mind the findings of the Home Office
commissioned research, Diary of a Police Officer, which found that on
average 43 per cent of a police officer’s time was spent in the police
49 RCCJ, Report, Cm 2263, (HMSO 1993), p. 73.
50 M. McConville and J. Hodgson, Custodial Legal Advice and the Right to Silence, Research Study
No 16 (HMSO 1993), p. 121.
51 Consultation Paper No. 157.
52 HC 7, Law Com. No. 269 (Law Commission 2001).
53 CM 5563 (HMSO 2002).
54 Published as PACE Review: Report of the Joint Home Office/Cabinet Office Review of the Police
and Criminal Evidence Act (Home Office, 2002).
55 Note 54, p. 54.
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station, and that on average it took three hours to “process” a prisoner
following an arrest.56 The Joint Review, published just days before the
Criminal Justice Bill was introduced in Parliament in November 2002,57
recommended that the PACE 1984 be amended to allow a police
officer to “offer an arrested person immediate bail from the scene of the
arrest on condition that they must attend a specified police station at a
specified time in the future”.58 Other than stating that both “police
officers and lawyers recognise the substantial benefits that [street bail]
can offer in terms of saved resources and reduced re-offending rates”,
the report provided no evidence of the efficacy of street bail other than
a reference to the Milton Keynes retail theft initiative model (which, in
fact, did not involve street bail), and gave no indication that issues
raised by such a radical departure from previous bail powers had been
considered. The Review made no mention of a power to attach con-
ditions to “street bail”.
The Criminal Justice Act 2003 reflected the recommendations of the
Joint Review regarding street bail by inserting four new sections into
the PACE 1984, ss. 30A, 30B, 30C and 30D.59 As originally enacted, the
PACE 1984, s. 30, required a police officer, having arrested a person at
a place other than a police station, to take them to a police station as
soon as practicable after the arrest. There were only two exceptions to
this obligation: first, the person could be “de-arrested” before being
taken to a police station if the officer was satisfied that there were
no grounds for keeping the person under arrest (s. 30(7)); second, the
officer could delay taking the arrested person to a police station if
their presence elsewhere was necessary in order to carry out “such
investigations as it is reasonable to carry out immediately” (s. 30(10)),
for example, to conduct a search of premises where the person was
when they were arrested, or immediately before they were arrested,
under the PACE 1984, s. 32.
Section 30 was amended by the CJA 2003 so that the obligation to
take the arrested person to a police station was made subject to release
on bail under a new s. 30A (that is, “street bail”).60 Section 30A em-
powers a police officer to release the arrested person on bail at any time
before arrival at a police station, subject to a requirement that they
56 PA Consulting Group, Diary of a Police Officer, Police Research Series Paper 149 (Home Office
2001), pp. 9 and 12 respectively. It was subsequently estimated that allowing an officer to bail an
arrested person to attend a police station on a future date could save 390,000 hours of officers’
time annually. See Policing Bureaucracy Taskforce, Street Bail: an Alternative to Immediate
Detention, (Home Office 2004). For an analysis, see A. Hucklesby, “Not Necessarily a Trip to the
Police Station: The Introduction of Street Bail” [2004] Crim. L.R. 803.
57 See M. Zander, “The Joint Review of PACE: a Deplorable Report” (2003) 153 N.L.J. 204, and
E. Cape, “Criminal Justice Act 2003 – no debate?” (2004) January Legal Action 6.
58 Note 54 above, p. 23.
59 By CJA 2003, s. 4.
60 It also made the obligation specifically subject to the power to de-arrest the person under s. 30(7).
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attend a police station on a future date. On granting bail, the officer is
required to give the person a written notice specifying the offence for
which the person was arrested and the grounds of arrest, the police
station that they are required to attend, and the time of attendance
(s. 30B(1)-(4)).61 No conditions on bail were permitted other than
the requirement to attend a police station (s. 30A(4)). Failure to attend
the specified police station at the specified time renders the person
liable to arrest, although such failure is not an offence (s. 30D(1)).
In a sense, this was simply an enactment of an idea first mooted
by the Philips Commission, namely the attendance notice.62 The
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights concluded that the
new power did not represent a significant interference with the ECHR
Article 5.63 However, surprisingly, the grounds for releasing a person on
street bail were not set out in statute, and there is no statutory obli-
gation to give the arrested person notice of the grounds or reasons for
releasing them on bail. Home Office Circular 61/2003, Criminal Justice
Act 2003: Bail Elsewhere Than at a Police Station does set out factors
that an officer is required to take into account in deciding whether to
release an arrested person on street bail. These include: the type of
offence for which the person has been arrested;64 whether a delay would
lead to loss of vital evidence; whether the person is fit to be released;
whether they understand what is happening; whether they are likely to
commit further offences; and whether the officer is satisfied that the
correct name and address has been given by the arrested person. The
legislation imposes no lower age limit in respect of the use of street bail,
although the Circular provides that where the arrested person is under
17 years of age, telephone contact should be made as soon as practi-
cable with their parent, guardian or other carer.
The CJA 2003 made a further change to police powers to release a
person on bail prior to charge in order to facilitate the statutory
charging scheme that was also introduced by the 2003 Act, under which
Crown Prosecutors took over many of the charging responsibilities of
the police. Previously, having determined that there was sufficient evi-
dence to charge, the custody officer was required to either charge the
person or release them. Under the statutory charging regime, custody
officers retain responsibility for determining whether there is sufficient
evidence to charge under the PACE 1984, s. 37(7), but other than in
minor cases or urgent situations, they must refer the case to a Crown
61 Although if no police station or time is specified, it must subsequently be specified in a written
notice (s. 30B(5)).
62 See RCCP Report (note 44 above), para. 8.5.
63 Joint Committee on Human Rights, Second Report on the Criminal Justice Bill HL (2002–02) 40,
paras. 36–42.
64 In fact, the Circular states “What type of offence has been committed?” (emphasis added),
providing an interesting, if disconcerting, insight into the Home Office attitude to due process.
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Prosecutor for them to make the charge decision.65 If the decision is
that the person should be charged, the matter is then referred back
to the custody officer to administer the charge, and to consider bail
under the PACE 1984, s. 38. Section 37(7)(a) was amended to allow the
custody officer to release the person on bail pending a decision as to
charge by a Crown Prosecutor. Although many police stations now
have a “co-located” prosecutor, at least during office hours, and CPS
Direct has been established to permit contact with a prosecutor at
times when a prosecutor is not physically present at a police station,66
this amendment gives custody officers some flexibility if a Crown
Prosecutor is not immediately available.
For the first time, the police were also given the power to attach
conditions to bail granted to a person not charged. This was done by
way of an amendment to the PACE 1984, s. 47(1A), applying the
“normal powers to impose conditions of bail”67 to bail under s. 37(7)(a).
The amendment itself was buried in Schedule 2, para. 6(3), of the CJA
2003. This significant extension to police powers which, as explained
below, was rapidly expanded to pre-charge bail granted under other
provisions of the PACE 1984 by subsequent legislation, thus saw the
light of day in a most unprepossessing way. The power to impose
conditions had not figured in any of the pre-legislative reviews or white
papers. The Explanatory Notes to the Act made no mention of the new
power to impose conditions other than in respect of the power of arrest
where conditions are broken, and the procedure to be followed under
the PACE 1984, s. 37C, where such an arrest takes place. In other
words, a major expansion of police powers which, we argue, has con-
siderable constitutional and human rights implications, was simply
surreptitiously slipped on to the statute book.
The next major Home Office consultation paper, Policing:
Modernising Police Powers to Meet Community Needs,68 whilst making
significant proposals to extend police powers of arrest, which were in-
corporated into the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005,
made no mention of police bail.69 Neither did the white paper Building
65 See Director’s Guidance on Charging, available at http://www.cps.gov.uk/Publications/
directors_guidance/dpp_guidance.html, and I. Brownlee, “The statutory charging scheme in
England and Wales: towards a unified prosecution system?” [2004] Crim. LR. 896.
66 For information on CPS Direct, see http://www.cps.gov.uk/direct/. For a critical account see
J. Jackson, “Police and Prosecutors after PACE: The Road from Case Construction to Case
Disposal” in E. Cape and R. Young, Regulating Policing: The Police and Criminal Evidence Act
1984 Past, Present and Future (Oxford 2008).
67 Which has the meaning set out in Bail Act 1976, s. 3(6).
68 (Home Office 2004).
69 The Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005, Part 3, amended PACE 1984, ss. 24 and 25,
and other legislation, to make all offences arrestable. See R. Austin, “The New Powers of Arrest:
Plus c¸a change: More of the Same or Major Change?” [2007] Crim. L.R. 459; J. Spencer,
“Extending the police state” (2005) N.L.J. 1 April, 477; and E. Cape, “Ever increasing police
powers” (2005) February Legal Action 8.
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Communities, Beating Crime: a better police service for the 21st century,70
also published in 2004, which was followed by the Police and Justice
Act (PJA) 2006. However, the 2006 Act significantly extended the
power of the police to impose conditions when releasing a person on
bail, both street bail, and bail without charge from a police station.
In relation to street bail, the PJA 2006, s. 10 and Schedule 6,
amended the PACE 1984, s. 30A, so that an officer releasing an
arrested person on bail under s. 30A(1) is empowered to impose such
conditions as appear to the officer necessary:
! to secure the person surrenders to custody;
! to secure that the person does not commit an offence while on bail;
! to secure that the person does not interfere with witnesses or
otherwise obstruct the course of justice; or
! for the person’s own protection or, if the person is under the age
of 17, for the person’s own welfare or in their own interests
(s. 30A(3B)).71
The conditions cannot include a surety or security but, subject to some
minor limitations, they are otherwise unrestricted provided that they
are imposed for one of the statutory purposes. As the Parliamentary
Joint Committee on Human Rights noted “conditions attached to the
grant of bail can include various restrictions such as curfews, tagging,
limits on the places a person can visit, or on people with whom they can
speak or meet”.72 This further extension of police powers rightly caused
much concern. The extension of street bail could, in Liberty’s opinion,
cause “potentially severe restrictions on liberty that could remain in
place indefinitely and could be used as a long lasting preventative
measure” beyond the supervision of the courts.73 To balance the new
power Liberty argued, unsuccessfully, that the bill should be amended
to impose automatic time limits on the duration of street bail.
If conditions are imposed, the written notice that must be given to
the person under s. 30B must specify the requirements imposed by
those conditions, and explain the opportunity to apply for variation of
the conditions, but does not have to state the grounds or reasons for
imposition of the conditions (s. 30B(4A)). Provision was also made for
the person to apply for variation of the conditions to a custody officer
70 CM 6360 (Home Office 2004).
71 It should be noted that whilst the provisions regarding conditional bail apply throughout England
and Wales some police forces, such as Hampshire Constabulary, currently do not permit their
officers to impose conditional street bail. See http://www.hampshire.police.uk/NR/rdonlyres/
A914C82D-C701-444F-96CE-DF8FBC487440/0/00901.pdf.
72 Joint Committee on Human Rights, Legislative Scrutiny: Tenth Progress Report HL 186 I/HC
1138 (2005–06), 1.11, a point later repeated in Joint Committee On Human Rights, Counter–
Terrorism Policy and Human Rights (Tenth Report): Counter–Terrorism Bill HL 108 (2007–
2008), 50.
73 Briefing on the Police and Justice Bill 2006 (Liberty, London 2006), p. 11.
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or to a magistrates’ court (ss. 30CA and 30CB), but not to challenge the
decision to release them on bail. Section 30D was amended to empower
the police to arrest the person if they have reasonable grounds for
suspecting that they have broken any of the conditions, although
breach of conditions is not an offence. The police may also arrest a
person for failure to surrender to street bail.
The government conceded in its s. 19 Human Rights Act 1998
statement74 that the extended powers have the potential to interfere
with a range of Convention rights but nonetheless argued that any
restrictions would be justified.75 These conclusions were supported by
the Joint Committee. First, the Committee argued that the power to
impose street bail was conditional, and subject to restriction. Second,
the suspect must be provided with a notice specifying the conditions,
and detailing how he might obtain a variation of them. Third, the
custody officer has a power to vary those conditions, and thereafter the
suspect may further apply to a magistrates’ court. The Joint Committee
concluded that “in view of these limits and safeguards, and in particu-
lar in light of the opportunity to go before a court to ask for the bail
conditions to be varied, in our view the provisions in the Bill concern-
ing police bail (sic) do not give rise to a significant risk of incompati-
bility with Articles 5, 8, 10 or 11 ECHR”.76 The committee did not,
however, consider whether or not the police should, in principle, have
such a power and indeed whether, in a wider sense, such powers are
compatible with Convention rights.
With regard to bail from a police station in circumstances where the
person has not been charged the PACE 1984, s. 47(1A), was amended
to permit conditions to be imposed whenever a person is released on
bail under the PACE 1984, s. 37.77 Conditions can be imposed for the
same purposes as under s. 30A, but in this case a surety or security can
74 Under s. 19 the minister responsible for a bill must certify either that it is compatible with ECHR
rights or that, despite the fact that it is not, he nevertheless wishes the House to proceed with
consideration of it.
75 “432. Part 2 – Powers of police etc: police bail.
The provisions in Schedule 4 in respect of police bail engage Article 5 to the extent to which they
permit an individual to be arrested or detained at a police station and permit the imposition of a
condition restricting a person’s movement to such an extent as to fall within the scope of Article 5
(for example, severe restrictions on a person’s free moment). They may also engage Article 8
because they may interfere with the person’s right to a private life (for example, a prohibition on
visiting certain persons). Any interference with Article 5 would be justified under Article 5(1) (b) as
being in order to secure the fulfilment of an obligation prescribed by law or under Article 5(1) (c)
as being for the purpose of bringing the person before the competent legal authority on reasonable
suspicion of having committed an offence. Any interference with Article 8 would be justified on
the basis that it is necessary for the prevention of disorder or crime under Article 8(2).” Police and
Justice Bill Explanatory Notes available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200506/
ldbills/104/en/06104x-f.htm.
76 Note 72 above at para. 1.15.
77 It does not extend to permitting conditions to be imposed where a person is released on bail
without charge under other sections of PACE 1984, eg., under s. 34(5): R (Torres) v.
Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2007] EWHC 3212 (Admin).
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also be required. There are also similar provisions to those applying to
street bail regarding variation of conditions and arrest for breach of
conditions, and for failure to surrender (PACE 1984, ss. 30D, 46A(1),
and 47(1D) and (1E), and Bail Act 1976, s. 3A(4)).78 Unlike street bail,
the custody officer must give reasons for imposing conditions, both
orally and in writing (Bail Act 1976, s. 5A(2) and (3)).
The provisions governed by s. 47(1A) affect two distinct classes of
people. Where an arrested person is taken to a police station, the cus-
tody officer must initially determine whether there is sufficient evidence
to charge the person with the offence for which they were arrested
(s. 37(1)). If the officer decides that there is insufficient evidence to
justify a charge they must release them (on bail or without bail) unless
detention is necessary for the purposes of the investigation. It was held
in R (Torres) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis79 that release
on conditional bail under s. 37(2) is possible at any point during police
detention where the custody officer has not (yet) determined that there
is sufficient evidence to charge. Thus conditional bail, including a sur-
ety or security, can be imposed on a person where there is no more
evidence that they committed an offence than that required for the
purposes of arrest. The second class of person is that where the custody
officer has determined under s. 37(7) that there is sufficient evidence to
charge. In these circumstances, the officer can bail the person pending a
charge decision by a Crown Prosecutor (s. 37(7)(a)(i)), or can bail
them “not for that purpose” (s. 37(7)(b)). The latter provision enables
the custody officer to bail a person where they wish to continue the
investigation or, for example, to allow consideration to be given to a
conditional caution.80 It should be noted that the meaning of “sufficient
evidence to charge” is both problematic and controversial.81 The
current version of the DPP’s Guidance on Charging82 provides that
78 Note that the government has proposed that the power to impose conditions be extended to pre-
charge bail granted under other provisions in the PACE 1984, that the police should have powers
of arrest in respect of anticipated breach of conditions or anticipated failure to surrender to
custody, and that failure to surrender to street bail be made a criminal offence. See Modernising
Police Powers: Review of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) 1984: Consultation Paper
(Home Office 2007), and PACE Review: Government proposals in response to the Review of the
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (Home Office August 2008).
79 [2007] EWHC 3212 (Admin). The custody officer had purported to impose conditional bail under
s. 34(5), which is not permissible, but the court held that where a custody officer had not
determined that there was sufficient evidence to charge, the police had a choice of which section to
use, and using s. 37(2) would enable them to impose conditions.
80 Conditional cautions, which are a matter for a Crown Prosecutor, are governed by the CJA 2003
Part 3. It should be noted that s. 37 is not satisfactory in that where a person is bailed under
s. 37(7)(b), arguably they cannot be further detained for questioning or investigation when they
surrender to bail since, under s. 37(1), the custody officer must decide whether there is sufficient
evidence to charge (which, of course, has already been determined before bail was granted) and,
determining that there is such evidence, must deal with the person under s. 37.
81 See G v. Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police [2006] EWHC 3485 (Admin), and for an analysis
see E. Cape, “Police Bail and the Decision to Charge: Recent Developments and the Human
Rights Deficit” (2007) Archbold News 7, 6.
82 See note 65 above.
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in determining whether there is sufficient evidence to charge under s. 37
for the purpose of deciding whether to refer the case to a Crown
Prosecutor for a charge decision, the custody officer should apply the
Threshold Test. This test is defined as an “assessment of whether…
there is at least a reasonable suspicion against the person of having
committed an offence… and that at that stage it is in the public interest
to proceed”.83 Thus, apart from the public interest element, the
threshold for deciding whether to bail a person under s. 37(7) is, as with
bail under s. 37(2), potentially no higher than that required for the
initial arrest.
Consequently, a person can be subjected to conditional bail, whe-
ther street bail or bail from a police station, in circumstances where, at
most, there is only a reasonable suspicion that they have committed an
offence. In fact, since some arrest powers do not require reasonable
suspicion, that is those under the PACE 1984, s. 24(1)(a), (b) and (3)(a),
a person can be subjected to conditional bail even though the grounds
for suspicion do not satisfy the requirements of reasonable suspicion.
In any event, the case law on reasonable suspicion sets a very low
threshold,84 and in forming a suspicion the officer can rely on hearsay
and other information that would not amount to admissible evidence.85
Research evidence suggests that even this low threshold does not
impose a significant limitation on the police, leading Sanders and
Young to conclude that it “is such a low threshold that most arrests
are based on weak evidence, and many are based on virtually no
evidence”.86
III. KEY FEATURES OF POLICE BAIL WITHOUT CHARGE
As noted earlier, when the power of the police to grant pre-charge
bail was first enacted it was regarded as being beneficial to suspects,
enabling them to be released from custody, and possibly avoid a court
appearance altogether. However, pre-charge bail then operated in
a significantly different context than in the modern era. Arrest applied
at a different point of an investigation in 1925. Arrest would have
83 Director’s Guidance on Charging, note 65 above, at [3.10]. The test in the revised Code for Crown
Prosecutors, which came into force in February 2010, retains the reasonable suspicion test, but
also requires the Crown prosecutor to be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing
that further evidence sufficient to satisfy the full code test will become available within a
reasonable period of time.
84 See, for example, Castorina v. Chief Constable of Surrey (1988) 138 N.L.J. 180; O’Hara v. Chief
Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [1997] AC 286; Al Fayed v. Metropolitan Police
Commissioner [2004] EWCA Civ 1579; Chief Constable of West Yorkshire v. Armstrong [2008]
EWCA Civ 1582; and Alford v. Chief Constable of Cambridgeshire [2009] EWCA Civ 100.
Contrast R v. Olden [2007] EWCA Crim 726; and Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis v.
Raissi [2008] EWCA Civ 1237.
85 See, for example, King v. Gardner (1979) 71 Cr App R 13, and Clarke v. Chief Constable of North
Wales Police [2000] All E.R. (D) 477.
86 A. Sanders and R. Young, Criminal Justice (3rd ed., Oxford 2007), p. 164.
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occurred at the end of a police investigation, when it was necessary to
bring a person before a court,87 or because a judicial warrant had been
issued.88 As recently as 1970 Lord Devlin observed that “as a general
rule […] an arrest should not be made until the case is complete”.89 As a
result, police bail was a short term convenience. Today, however, an
arrest is usually the starting point in an investigation.90 All that need
be sufficient for the arrest to take place is, at most, a “reasonable sus-
picion”91 which, as demonstrated earlier, amounts to a low threshold
that in practice is often ignored. As arrest has migrated within
the investigative phase of criminal investigation, so that it may now be
exercised at the inception of an investigation rather than at the end,
the power to bail persons arrested has taken on a different character.
Rather than being used for short periods in a manner protective of
liberty it now has the potential, as Liberty pointed out, to be used by
the police as a tool to control suspects for lengthy periods of time.92
Nevertheless, might it not be argued that police bail, particularly
when it is granted unconditionally, continues to fulfill a function that
enhances the liberty of the suspect? It is often assumed that a person
released on bail is simply at liberty, and that bail thus enhances liberty.
Clearly such a person is no longer in detention or imprisoned,93 but are
they at liberty? Historically, a person on bail was described as being “at
large on bail”, and their condition was described as being in a “living
prison”.94 The surety was, in effect, a gaoler or keeper of the principal.
In fact so entrenched was the position and function of the surety that
where the accused did not have any sureties the gaol was, in effect,
87 John Lewis & Co v. Tims [1952] A.C. 676, 691–2 (Lord Porter). Although Tims concerned arrest by
store detective Lord Porter was careful to say that his remarks applied, mutatis mutandi, to police
officers (680).
88 Before 1967 this is all that the common law would have permitted; Criminal Law Act 1967, s. 2.
89 Hussein v. Chong Fook Kam (1970) A.C. 942, 948 (Lord Devlin). In this Lord Devlin was echoing
Lord Porter in Tims: “Those who arrest must be persuaded of the guilt of the accused; they cannot
bolster up their assurance or the strength of the case by seeking further evidence and detaining the
man arrested meanwhile or taking him to some spot where they can or may find further evidence”
(691).
90 Holgate-Mohammed v. Duke (1984) A.C. 437, 441–442 (Lord Diplock).
91 A position that has been held to be acceptable under the ECHR. See for exampleMurray v.United
Kingdom [1994] ECHR 14310/88. It must be said that the reasoning of the majority in this case is
far from convincing.
92 This is an unhappy legacy of the effect of the decisions in cases such as Dallison v. Caffery [1965] 1
Q.B. 348 and Holgate-Mohammed v. Duke [1984] A.C. 437 that allowed the police to use arrest as
an investigatory tool. In these cases no thought was given to the wider implications of allowing the
police to arrest for investigations rather than to bring a person suspected of offending before a
magistrates’ court.
93 Syed Mahamad Yusuf-Ud-Din v. Secretary of State for India in Council (1903) 19 T.L.R. 496, 497
(Lord MacNaghten). In Syed the Privy Council held that once a prisoner was freed on bail he was
no longer imprisoned and could not thus bring an action for false imprisonment for the time he
spent on bail. The decision of the Judicial Committee is per incuriam. The cases referred to below
were not cited before the Committee or referred to in its judgment.
94 E. de Haas, “Concepts of the Nature of Bail in English and American Criminal Law” (1946) 6
University of Toronto Law Journal 385, 393. The phrase comes from the account found in the
L’Ancienne Coutume de Normandie.: the “accused was considered as being held by the sureties in
lieu of a prison of stone and mortar” (de Haas, (393)).
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considered to be the surety.95 Bailed defendants were considered to be
in custody.96 Thus, for instance, Babington J concluded that “he who is
all the time under bail, the law adjudges him in prison”.97 Moreover,
“the bail have their principal always upon a string, and may pull the
string whenever they please”.98 The admission to bail was therefore only
a change in custody.99 This traditional view of bail was to some extent
undermined by the Bail Act 1898, which empowered justices to dis-
pense with sureties if they decided it was in the interests of justice to do
so,100 and the Bail Act 1976, under which bail is to be normally granted
without sureties.101 However, this does not mean that being “at large on
bail” can simply be equated with being at liberty or, indeed, that bail
should necessarily be seen as enhancing liberty.
As noted earlier, a person who has been granted bail by the police
can be arrested if they fail to surrender on the due date. If conditions
are imposed, they can be arrested for failure to comply with those
conditions.102 There is no time limit on street bail or pre-charge bail,
and in respect of the latter no limitation on repeated releases on bail.103
Proposed amendments to the Police and Justice Bill, which would have
limited conditions attached to street bail to a maximum of 72 hours,
were rejected by the government.104 In the absence of official statistics
95 de Haas (note 94 above) 393–394.
96 The early English case law is meticulously catalogued in de Haas, and is drawn upon here.
97 Year Book, 4 Hen. VI at 8 pl. 21.
98 Anon (1704) 6 Mod. Rep. 231. This is a view long approved by the Supreme Court of the USA:
“When bail is given the principal is regarded as delivered to the custody of his sureties. Their
dominion is a continuance of the original imprisonment” (Taylor v. Taintor 83 U.S. 366, 371–372
(1872)). Following the decision of the USA Supreme Court in Leary v.United States 224 U.S. 567,
575–576 (1912) a contract system of bail replaced the common law one. This is an approach
contrary to public policy in English law: “When a man is ordered to find bail, and a surety
becomes responsible for him, the surety is bound at his peril to see that his principal obeys “the
order, of the Court: at least, this is the, rule in the criminal law; but if money to the amount for
which the surety is bound is deposited, with him as an indemnity against, any loss which he may
sustain, by reason of his principal’s conduct, the surety has no interest in taking care that the
condition of the recognisance is performed. Therefore the contract between the plaintiff and
the defendant is tainted with illegality” (Herman v. Jeuchner (1884–85) L.R. 15 Q.B.D. 561, 563
(Brett MR)).
99 Foxall v. Barnett (1853) 23 L.J.Q.B. 7, 8 (Coleridge J ).
100 A. Bottomley, “The Granting of Bail: Principles and Practice” (1968) 31 M.L.R. 40, 49.
Parliament acted because the poor were needlessly detained as a result of being unable to find
sureties with sufficient resources, and the view was formed that the poor need not provide sureties
as they were less likely to abscond.
101 Schedule 2 of the Bail Act 1976 dispensed with the term “at large on bail” so far as statute is
concerned. but see R v. Rebecca Saw [2009] EWCA Crim 1, [2009] 2 Cr. App. R (S) 54, 43 (Judge
LCJ).
102 For the former Labour government’s proposals to extend powers of arrest to anticipated breach of
conditions or failure to surrender to custody, and to make them criminal offences, see note
78 above.
103 This may be contrasted with police bail post-charge where, under PACE 1984, s. 47(3A), the date
of the first court appearance must normally be no later than the first sitting of the relevant
magistrates’ court after the person is charged. It may also be contrasted with bail from a court
where, whilst there are no time limits in relation to bail itself, there are in practice a number of
factors limiting the period for which a defendant will be on bail.
104 House of Commons Standing Committee D, 21 March 2006, Hansard cols. 136–138. The policy
guidance issued by the Kent Police states that normally street bail should have a return date of no
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or research evidence on the use of police bail, we have to rely on
anecdotal evidence. This suggests that it is not unusual for suspects to
be released on pre-charge bail for six months, and in some cases for
them to be re-bailed for similar periods on a number of occasions.
Prolonged release on pre-charge bail was unsuccessfully challenged in
R (C) v Chief Constable of A and A Magistrates’ Court.105 The appli-
cant, having been arrested in connection with offences concerning child
pornography, was then bailed without charge for a period exceeding
six months.106 He argued, inter alia, that this imposed severe restrictions
on his business activities which frequently took him abroad. The
Divisional Court, whilst stating that it was not the case that it would
never intervene in a criminal investigation, said that intervention would
only be appropriate in the most exceptional circumstances, and this
case did not satisfy that requirement.
Despite the fact that police bail may have serious implications for
the liberty of the suspect, both street bail and pre-charge bail are
available irrespective of the seriousness of the suspected offence and,
therefore, conditional bail can be imposed however minor the offence
for which a person has been arrested and/or detained. Indeed, in the
case of street bail, Home Office Circular 61/2003 discourages its use in
more serious cases, stating that it is unlikely that it would be granted
“in relation to a serious arrestable offence”.107 In order for conditions to
be imposed, the relevant officer must simply consider that they are
necessary for one or more of the statutory purposes. It was held in R v
Mansfield Justices ex p Sharkey,108 in relation to bail conditions im-
posed by a court, that the perceived risk must be real, and not merely
fanciful. Although similar principles should apply to police bail, the
process by which the bail decision is made does not allow for the
necessity of the conditions to be tested. There is no provision (either in
statute or the PACE Codes of Practice) for the suspect to make re-
presentations, either about bail itself or as to conditions.109 Even if they
are able to make representations, there is no obligation on the police to
take them into account in making their decision. Although reasons
must be given for any conditions imposed on pre-charge bail, this is not
more than two weeks, although it does envisage that it could be up to six weeks, or even longer in
exceptional circumstances.
105 [2006] EWHC 2352 (Admin).
106 This was unconditional bail, since the provision of Police and Justice Act 2006 had not then been
brought into effect, but it is unlikely that it would have made any difference if conditions had been
imposed since, in any case, the court could have varied or removed the conditions.
107 Home Office Circular 61/2003 Criminal Justice Act 2003: Bail Elsewhere than at a Police Station,
section C. Since this circular was issued, the category of “serious arrestable offence”, previously
defined in PACE 1984, s. 116 and Sch. 5, has been abolished by CJA 2003, Sch. 7, para. 43. Some
police forces, in their internal guidance, also stress that street bail will normally only be suitable in
relation to minor offences. See, for example, Kent Police Policy Document N64 Bail, para 19.2.
108 [1985] Q.B. 613.
109 Again, this may be contrasted with court bail.
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the case for street bail, and there is no obligation on the police to
articulate grounds for the decision to bail.
In its report Bail and the Human Rights Act 1998 the Law
Commission emphasised the importance of proportionality in relation
to the imposition of bail conditions.110 Since, as noted earlier, the police
have the power to arrest for any offence however minor, and given that
conditional police bail is available where a person has been arrested in
respect of any offence, the issue of proportionality is left to each indi-
vidual officer making a bail decision. This is stressed in the policy
guidance issued by a number of police forces111 but the Home Office
Circular on street bail, whilst requiring that officers use the power
“fairly, objectively and without any bias against ethnic or other groups
within the community”,112 makes no explicit reference to the need to
apply bail powers in a proportionate way.113 This is of particular im-
portance in respect of street bail because the bail decision is made by
the arresting officer, who will normally be of constable rank (as com-
pared to a custody officer at a police station who must normally be of
the rank of at least sergeant),114 and in circumstances where none of the
due process safeguards that apply at a police station, such as the re-
quirement to make a record of the decision in the custody record,115
custody suite CCTV, and access to legal advice, are available or ap-
plicable.
IV. POLICE BAIL AND ARTICLE 5 ECHR
Article 5 (1)(c) ECHR permits a deprivation of liberty by “the lawful
arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him
before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having
committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to
110 See, for example, Bail and the Human Rights Act 1998, HC 7, (Law Commission 2001) at 73 and
81. In its submission to the Commission, the Metropolitan Police expressed concern that bail
conditions (following charge) were being imposed for non-imprisonable offences where there were
no grounds for detaining the person in custody pending their court appearance.
111 For example, Kent Police (see note 107 above), at para 13.2 in respect of bail granted by a custody
officer, although this is not explicitly repeated in respect of street bail decisions.
112 Note 107 above, at para. A.5.
113 It should be noted that neither the legislation nor Home Office Circular 61/2003 makes any special
provision in respect of juveniles beyond, in the case of the latter, requiring the parent or carer to be
informed. Despite the fact that Youth Justice Board guidance emphasises the importance of bail
supervision and bail support schemes for juveniles, the provisions regarding street bail and pre-
charge bail apply to juveniles in the same way as they apply to adults except that conditions can
additionally be imposed on a juvenile for their own welfare or in their own interests. There is no
equivalent to the Children and Young Persons Act 1933, s. 44(1), which requires a court when
dealing with a child or young person to have regard to their welfare.
114 PACE 1984, s. 36(3).
115 Bail Act 1976, s. 5A. A suspect’s lawyer has a right to inspect the custody record as soon as
practicable after their arrival at a police station (PACE Code of Practice C, para. 2.4), and the
suspect and their lawyer are entitled to a copy of the custody record if a request is made when
the person is taken to court or within 12 months of release from police detention (PACE Code C,
para. 2.4A).
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prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so”;
provided always that this is in accordance with a procedure prescribed
by law. However, this power to interfere with liberty is circumscribed
by Article 5(3) which provides that where a person is so arrested
or detained they “shall be brought promptly before a judge or other
officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled
to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release
may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial”. The European
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has consistently held that the pur-
pose of Article 5 is not only to prevent incommunicado detention but
also arbitrary deprivations of liberty by the police and other agents
of the state.116 Given that Article 5 is a right of primary importance in
a democracy,117 a person is “not to be deprived, or to continue to be
deprived, of their liberty save in accordance with the conditions speci-
fied in paragraph 1 of Article 5 … [and that] list of exceptions … is an
exhaustive one and only a narrow interpretation of those exceptions is
consistent with the aim of that provision, namely to ensure that no one
is arbitrarily deprived of his or her liberty”.118 Where a person is sus-
pected of having committed a criminal offence there is a balance to be
struck between the liberty of the individual, who is presumed to be
innocent, and the interests of the state in the administration of justice,
which includes the prosecution of offenders. A court of law or judicial
officer provides an independent and impartial mechanism by which
these conflicting interests can be fairly and impartially weighed.
Closely associated with the right to liberty is the presumption of
innocence.119 Judicial bail and, indeed, bail following charge plays a
vital role in protecting the presumption of innocence. As Vinson CJ put
it “unless the right to bail before trial is preserved, the presumption of
innocence, secured only after centuries of struggle, would lose its
meaning”.120 The presumption of innocence is more than a mere rule of
evidence;121 it is a bulwark against the imposition of punishment before
conviction. It is often asserted, particularly in common law jurisdic-
tions, that the guarantees of Article 6, and thus Article 6(2), apply from
the point of charge. However, it has been recognised in domestic
law that some of the guarantees of Article 6 also have application at
the pre-charge stage.122 The ECHR has also ruled that Article 6(2) can
apply prior to the point at which formal criminal proceedings are
116 Asseov v. Bulgaria [1998] ECHR 24760/94, at [146].
117 McKay v. United Kingdom [2006] ECHR 543/03 [30].
118 Ladent v. Poland [2008] ECHR 11036/03, at [45]–[46].
119 Now given statutory force in the United Kingdom by virtue of Human Rights Act 1998, Sch. 1.
120 Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951).
121 M. Zander, “Bail: A Re-appraisal” [1967] Crim. L.R. 25, 26.
122 Dumbell v. Roberts [1944] 1 All ER 326, 329 (Scott L.J.): “The British principle of personal
freedom, that every man should be presumed innocent until he is proved guilty, applies also to the
police function of arrest”.
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commenced,123 and thus the application of the presumption of inno-
cence is not limited to trial proceedings, but covers also the investi-
gatory phase. Thus it has been held that that Article 6 can be engaged
when a person is “substantially affected” by criminal proceedings.124
Furthermore, the ECtHR has interpreted Article 5(3) as protecting the
presumption of innocence. The guarantee in Article 5(3) applies irres-
pective of whether the authorities have charged someone or not:
“Article 6(2) governs criminal proceedings in their entirety”, from
the point of arrest through to the determination of guilt.125 As Duff
remarks, the presumption “requires courts to see the defendant as a
citizen who has committed no criminal wrong unless and until it is
proved that she is guilty of a particular wrong”.126 The suspicion that a
person might have committed a crime “does not warrant treating him
as guilty”.127
The presumption of innocence is relevant not just in relation to
remands in custody but also to bail conditions. Under the ECHR bail
conditions can only be lawful if they respect the presumption of inno-
cence. Preventative pretrial restrictions on liberty that are predicated
on the assumption that they are necessary to prevent further offending
are incompatible with the presumption of innocence.128 Thus in
Nerattini v. Greece129 the applicant had been refused bail by the Samos
Criminal Court, in part because it feared that if released he would
commit similar offences on bail.130 Even before the applicant had been
charged or convicted the Court refused bail on the basis that he showed
a “propensity to commit further offences relating to antiquities”.131 The
ECtHR held that this prejudicial labeling constituted an interference
with the presumption of innocence. The presumption of innocence,
of course, may be infringed by statements and actions of public
authorities other than courts.132 “The presumption of innocence”, the
123 In Fatullayev v. Azerbaijan [2010] ECHR40984/07 the European Court held that once the
applicant had been detained during an investigation, though not formally indicted, Article 6(2)
applied [155].
124 Serves v. France [1997] ECHR 82/1996/671/893, at [42]; Eckle v.Germany [1982] ECHR 8130/78, at
[73]. The narrow and literal approach of the English courts is at odds with this. See R (Ajaib) v.
BirminghamMagistrates Court [2009] EWHC 2127 (Admin) at [40] (Dobbs J), in which it was held
that Article 6 had no application to pre-charge bail since the applicant was not the subject of a
criminal charge. With respect this must be wrong. Whilst the extent of the rights that apply pre-
charge is not necessarily as extensive as those that apply during the trial it is wrong both in
principle and as a matter of authority to seek to place the articles of the ECHR in watertight
compartments. SeeMurray v.UK [1996] 18731/91. For an analysis of ECtHR jurisprudence on the
application of Article 6 ECHR to the investigative stage, see E. Cape, Z. Namoradze, R. Smith and
T. Spronken, Effective Criminal Defence in Europe (Antwerp 2010), ch. 2.
125 Garycki v. Poland [2007] ECHR 14348/02, at [68].
126 A. Duff, Answering for Crime (Oxford 2008), p. 196.
127 Duff (note 126 above), p. 197.
128 Lavents v. Latvia [2008] ECHR 58442/00, at [70].
129 Nerattini v. Greece [2008] ECHR 43529/07, at [34].
130 Nerattini, at [21].
131 Nerattini, at [25].
132 Allenet de Ribemont v. France [1996] ECHR 15175/89, at [36].
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ECtHR held in Garycki v Poland, “will be violated if a judicial decision
or a statement by a public official concerning a person charged with a
criminal offence reflects an opinion that he is guilty before he has been
proved guilty according to law … It suffices, even in the absence of any
formal finding, that there is some reasoning suggesting that the court
or the official regards the accused as guilty”.133 This is particularly
important in where the officer in question is exercising quasi-judicial
functions.134 Consequently it is arguable that the imposition of con-
ditional bail by police officers could in some cases be contrary to the
presumption of innocence; and where an officer attaches conditions
that are not trial related there is an attendant risk that the resulting
prejudicial aura of guilt may undermine the presumption of innocence
of the suspect in any subsequent judicial proceedings.
A. Prompt production before a judge
European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence on Article 5(3) re-
quires that production before a judge be both automatic and prompt.135
Within the terms of Article 5 once a person is arrested or detained the
temporal guarantees begin to run.136 Article 5(3) does not refer to arrest
and detention, but to arrest or detention. Therefore, it would seem that
the judicial review required by Article 5(3) is triggered by the arrest
(or detention) itself. This is nothing out of the ordinary since it is little
more than a statutory articulation of the old English common law
practice whereby an arrest was a mechanism for producing a person
before a court. Article 5 does not provide for any exception that au-
thorises the conditional release of an arrestee or detainee who, even on
police bail, continues to be substantially affected by proceedings
against him and thus within the protective ambit of both Article 5137
and 6.138
133 [2007] ECHR 14348/02, at [66].
134 Daktaras v. Lithuania [2001] ECHR 42095/98, at [42]: “Moreover, the principle of the presumption
of innocence may be infringed not only by a judge or court but also by other public authorities,
including prosecutors. This is particularly so where a prosecutor, as in the present case, performs a
quasi-judicial function when ruling on the applicant’s request to dismiss the charges at the stage of
the pre-trial investigation, over which he has full procedural control”.
135 Aquilina v. Malta [1999] ECHR 25642/94, [49].
136 And in the domestic context this is recognised by the fact that a person cannot be detained without
charge for longer than 36 hours before they must be produced to a magistrates’ court (PACE 1984,
ss. 41 and 42).
137 For example inRokhlina v.Russia [2005] ECHR 54071/00 the ECtHR held that for the purposes of
the Convention the applicant was “charged” when she was arrested on suspicion of murdering her
husband and taken into custody, even though she was not formally charged under Russian law
until some time later.
138 Article 6 will apply when a person is “charged”. The ECtHR has defined this “as the official
notification given to an individual by the competent authority of an allegation that he has
committed a criminal offence” (Deweer v. Belgium [1980] ECHR 6903/75, at [46]). While Article 6
does not fully apply until the suspect is formally charged, parts of that Article do apply at the pre-
trial stage in order that the rights of the defence are not subsequently prejudiced.
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Nothing in Article 5(3) excuses the state from bringing a person
arrested within the terms of Article 5(1)(c) promptly before a judge
of judicial officer.139 This obligation does not apply where a person is
arrested or detained for the purpose of securing the fulfillment of an
obligation prescribed by law, which is a permissible interference
with liberty under Article 5(1)(b). The government argued that this,
inter alia, was a reason why street bail would not contravene Article 5
rights.140 However, the power to impose street bail applies where a
person has been arrested for an offence (thus coming within Article
5(1)(c)), not where a person has been arrested in order to secure the
fulfillment of an obligation. It is the purpose of the arrest which is
relevant to whether this exception to the right to liberty applies, not the
purpose of the obligation.
Although Article 5(3) makes no reference to such a possibility, the
police are almost certainly absolved of the responsibility of prompt
production if the person is “de-arrested”, that is, released without bail
and unconditionally.141 However, release on police bail can hardly be
regarded as a “de-arrest” and it is not recognised as such by PACE
1984. As noted earlier, even if no conditions are attached to bail the
person is under a legal duty, on pain of criminal sanction in the case of
pre-charge bail (but not street bail), to surrender to bail on the due
date, and failure to surrender may result in their further arrest. Under
English law there is no automatic judicial review of the arrest or bail
decision. In fact, there is no review of an arrest at all unless the arrestee
commences legal proceedings for that purpose, or argues for exclusion
of evidence on the grounds of unlawful arrest in a criminal trial. With
regard to a police bail decision, there is no automatic judicial oversight.
If it is unconditional, the person bailed may bring judicial review pro-
ceedings, but the courts have demonstrated a marked reluctance to
intervene.142 In the case of conditional street bail the bailed person
cannot even make an application to a court to review any conditions
imposed until they have, at least, requested the police to vary the con-
ditions.
It might be argued that the drafters of Article 5 accurately reflected
policing practice at the time that the Convention was drafted,143 and did
not anticipate either the requirements of modern policing with its need,
in some cases, for lengthy investigation commencing with an arrest, or
139 The exceptions to the right to liberty contained in Article 5 are exhaustive and strictly defined.
They are to be construed narrowly in a way that favours the individual: Ilijkov v. Bulgaria [2001]
ECHR 33977/96, at [85].
140 See note 75 above.
141 The possibility of which is recognised by PACE 1984, s. 30(7) and (7A), although this terminology
is not used in the legislation.
142 See the text to note 105 above.
143 John Lewis v. Tims [1952] AC 676.
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the statutory sanctioning of this development without the parallel de-
velopment of safeguards to ensure the power was not abused. However,
if the silence of the Convention is accepted as a justification for
avoiding the need for prompt judicial review of arrest decisions where
police bail is granted it would mean, in effect, that arbitrary or dis-
proportionate arrest and bail decisions can be made with impunity. If
our interpretation is correct, it would be open to the police to bail
someone without having charged them provided that the judicial
supervision that Article 5(3) requires is satisfied within the time frame
tolerated by that Article.144 This would have been the de facto position
when pre-charge police bail was first enacted in the early part of the
twentieth century, but as we have demonstrated, arrest now has a dif-
ferent function within the criminal process.
B. Production before a judge or judicial officer
A further argument is that the police are acting quasi-judicially when
they grant bail, and that this satisfies the requirements of Article 5(3).
However, although an officer authorised by law to exercise judicial
power, within the terms of Article 5(3), is as the ECtHR observed in
Schiesser v Switzerland, not necessarily identical with a judge he “must
nevertheless have some of the latter’s attributes … that is to say he
must satisfy certain conditions each of which constitutes a guarantee
for the person arrested”.145 The quasi-judicial officer must be indepen-
dent of the executive and the parties. Moreover, he must discharge the
procedural and substantive requirements of Article 5(3). The quasi-
judicial officer must hear representations from the arrested individ-
ual,146 and he must decide whether the circumstances of the case justify
detention, conditional release or unconditional release. This substan-
tive decision must be undertaken against legal criteria.147
A custody officer, who is the officer responsible for making pre-
charge (but not street) bail decisions, is clearly not “an officer author-
ised by law” within the test set out in Schiesser. Although by the PACE
1984, s. 36(5), a custody officer must not be involved in the investi-
gation of the person in respect of whom a bail decision is to be made, he
is of relatively low rank and normally works in the same police station,
and for the same police force, as the officer carrying out the investi-
gation. The custody officer’s discretion to grant bail is to be exercised
144 Although there would still be no automatic judicial oversight of arrest decisions.
145 Schiesser v. Switzerland [1979] ECHR 7710/76, at [32].
146 Winterwerp v. Netherlands [1979] ECHR 6301/73, at [60].
147 Ireland v. United Kingdom [1978] ECHR 5310/71, at [199].
C.L.J. Police Bail Without Charge 553
in accordance with guidance produced by the Director of Public
Prosecutions, a party to any subsequent criminal proceedings.148 The
institutional closeness that this regime inevitably creates between
the custody officer and the prosecutor hardly enhances the indepen-
dence of the former.149 Furthermore, the custody officer has a conflict-
ing role.150 On the one hand he has to act effectively as judge in his own
cause, by determining whether the police have sufficient evidence to
proceed with a case, and on the other he has to consider whether a
suspect should be released. In such circumstances he can hardly be said
to be independent of the parties in the manner that Article 5(3) re-
quires.151 Research evidence as to the practice of custody officer, as
Hucklesby notes, shows that custody officers routinely confirm the
decisions and actions of the investigating officers.152 As the ECtHR
made clear in Salov v Ukraine,153 an investigating prosecutor under
Ukrainian law is not “an officer authorised by law to exercise judicial
power” for the purposes of Article 5(3). That must equally be true of
the custody officer in England and Wales.154
With regard to street bail the situation is in many ways even more
unsatisfactory. The officer making the bail decision is the officer who
has carried out the arrest, and the decision will be made away from the
police station and normally, literally, in the street. The streets have a
different dynamic than police stations. It is a setting in which police
officers exercising powers are not only unsupervised but are also in a
disproportionately stronger position vis-a`-vis the suspect.155 Moreover,
the constable is not even under the direct supervision of the courts in
the case of street bail since, as noted earlier, a suspect who wants to
148 Although by virtue of PACE 1984, s. 37A(1)(a), this would only apply to bail decisions made
under PACE 1984, s. 37(7), s. 37C(2) or s. 37CA(2) and not, for example, to bail under s. 37(2).
Custody officers are required to have regard to any such guidance (s. 37A(3)). It would seem that a
Crown Prosecutor does not have power to make a bail decision, or to direct a custody officer to
make a bail decision, in an individual case, although ss. 37B – 37CA are not completely clear on
this point. See Merit v. Ukraine [2004] ECHR 66561/01, at [62]–[63]; and also Niedbala v. Poland
[2000] ECHR 27915/95, at [51]–[57].
149 Pantea v. Romania [2003] ECHR 33343/96, at [236]–[239].
150 These conflicting roles are similar to those found in courts martial. SeeMiller v. UK [2004] ECHR
45825/99, at [29]–[30].
151 Thompson v. United Kingdom [2004] ECHR 36256/97, at [33].
152 A. Hucklesby, “Police Bail and the Use of Conditions” (2001) Criminology and Criminal Justice
441, 443.
153 [2005] ECHR 65518/01. At [58] the Court concluded: “The prosecution authorities not only belong
to the executive branch of the State, but they also concurrently perform investigative and
prosecution functions in criminal proceedings and are party to those proceedings. The Court
therefore reiterates its position as to the status of the prosecutor, who cannot be regarded as an
officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power! and rejects the Government’s arguments in
this respect”.
154 Both the police (Police Act 1996) and the Crown Prosecution Service (Prosecution of Offenders
Act 1985) are creatures of statute. Both are nominally operationally independent but are subject to
the control of the executive (Police Act 1996, s. 36A and Prosecution of Offences Act 1985,
ss. 2 and 9).
155 See A. Sanders and R. Young, Criminal Justice (3rd ed, Oxford University Press, 2007) especially
chapters 2 and 3.
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have his bail conditions reviewed must, in the first instance, apply to a
custody officer at the designated station and not to a magistrates’
court.156
V. BAIL CONDITIONS
We have argued that the legislative arrangements governing street and
pre-charge police bail contravene the requirements of Article 5(3)
ECHR. If that argument does not find favour, we argue in this section
that conditional street and pre-charge police bail may, nevertheless,
amount to a breach of ECHR rights in particular circumstances. Whilst
our focus is particularly on Article 5, conditional police bail may raise
questions about breach of other Convention rights, particularly the
right to private life under Article 8, the right to freedom of expression
under Article 10, and the right to freedom of assembly and association
under Article 11. The ECtHR has long held that “if a law confers
a discretion on a public authority it must indicate the scope of the
discretion”.157 The absence “of any details at all as to the kind of re-
strictions permitted or their purpose, duration and extent or the ar-
rangements of their review”158 will not be compatible with the principle
of legality. Such unconstrained powers lack the minimum degree of
protection against arbitrary interferences with Convention rights.159
The principle of legality not only requires that there be a legal basis for
the interference with Convention rights, but also that the law has cer-
tain qualities.160 First, the law must provide sufficient notice as to when
and how a public authority can resort to a restrictive measure. Second,
the law:
must afford a measure of legal protection against arbitrary inter-
ference by public authorities with the rights guaranteed by
the Convention … [I]n matters affecting fundamental rights it
would be contrary to the rule of law for legal discretion granted
to the executive to be expressed in terms of unfettered power …
[C]onsequently, the law must indicate the scope of any such dis-
cretion conferred on the competent authorities and the manner of
its exercise with sufficient clarity, having regard to the legitimate
aim of the measure in question, in order to give the individual
adequate protection against arbitrary interference.161
156 PACE 1984, s. 30CA. Subsequently the suspect can apply to a magistrates’ court under s. 30CB.
157 Herczegfalvy v. Austria [1993] ECHR 10533/83, at [89].
158 Note 156 above, at [96].
159 Note 156 above, at [96].
160 “Quality in this sense implies that where a national law authorises deprivation of liberty it must be
sufficiently accessible and precise, in order to avoid all risk of arbitrariness”: Amuur v. France
[1996] ECHR 19776/92, at [50].
161 Vlasov v. Russia [2008] ECHR 78146/01, at [125].
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The danger is that unconstrained powers allow arbitrary interferences
with Convention rights. Such powers may be used for purposes that are
neither necessary, nor within the original purpose.162
Pre-charge police bail (both street bail and bail from the police
station) with conditions attached could, in certain circumstances,
present such problems. For instance, the police might impose restric-
tions on demonstrators that are, in effect, the same as a bind-over by a
magistrates’ court. Not surprisingly, for some police officers, “bail
conditions are seen as levers of power over defendants … Conditions
might be added to police bail legitimately as … negotiating mechan-
isms, for example, in return for favours such as intelligence gathering
[or] as summary punishment to be meted out in the relative privacy of
the police station on those who otherwise might have been granted
unconditional bail”.163 Moreover, as Choongh has demonstrated, the
police use the legal canopy of powers to shield their control of what
they consider to be deviant populations. Police powers and the custody
suite constitute the criminal justice system for such people; a legal
twilight zone. Police bail without charge may amount to a power, par
excellence, for disciplining such people since it may be used at a time or
in circumstances where there is no intention to charge them, and thus
bring them into the legal system proper.164 This is not something that
sits comfortably with the requirements of the Convention with its
avowed prohibition of arbitrary interferences with Convention rights;
guarantees that are to be real and effective not theoretic and illusory.165
In order to ensure that discretionary powers are exercised appro-
priately the Convention requires that they are accompanied by effective
safeguards.166 Such safeguards have a number of benefits. Safeguards
can prevent discretionary powers being used in a way that is discrimi-
natory.167 Similarly, because a broad discretionary power makes it
difficult to know in what circumstances a person may legitimately
complain about the exercise of the power, clearly defining the power
enables effective ex post facto review and scrutiny.168 In turn, that
ensures the lawfulness of any interference with Convention rights.
If conditions are to be imposed, both in respect of street bail or pre-
charge bail, the officer must consider them “necessary” for one or more
162 Vasileva v. Denmark [2003] ECHR 52792/99.
163 J. Raine and M. Wilson, “Police Bail – Perspectives on the Use, Misuse and Consequences of new
Police Power” (1997) 37 British Journal of Criminology 593, 605.
164 S. Choongh, “Policing the Dross – A Social Disciplinary Model of Policing” (1998) 38 British
Journal of Criminology 623, 625; A. Hucklesby, “Police Bail and the Use of Conditions” (2001)
Criminology and Criminal Justice 441, 444.
165 See for example Artico v. Italy [1980] ECHR 6694/74.
166 Smirnov v. Russia [2005] ECHR 71362/01, at [49]; Gillan v. UK [2010] ECHR 4158/05, at [76]–[87].
167 Papachristou v. City of Jackonsville 405 US 156, 170 (1972).
168 Dawood v. Minister of Immigration [2000] CCT 35/99, at [47] (O’Regan J).
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of the statutory purposes.169 Whilst conditions must be necessary for
one of these primary purposes the police have a wide discretion to
attach ancillary conditions purportedly to support the primary one.170
So conditional bail might be viewed as necessary to prevent offending,
and primary conditions attached in order to achieve that, but ancillary
condition may additionally be imposed to ensure that the primary
condition is effective. However, simply because there is a correlation
between primary and ancillary conditions it does not mean that the
latter are compatible with the ECHR.171 The ancillary conditions might
have a legitimate aim but that alone does not make them proportion-
ate.
The problem here is that not only are the primary heads of justifi-
cation for bail broadly defined, for example the prevention of further
offending, but also that the discretionary powers to impose ancillary
conditions are also expressed in open-ended terms. The latter is ex-
acerbated by the fact that there is also no statutory guidance on how
the power to impose conditions is to be exercised, and what conditions
might be appropriate or acceptable. The guidance that is available is
scattered across various sources such as Home Office circulars172 and
Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) guidance. Arguably, this
non-statutory guidance does not satisfy the requirement of legality in-
herent in the Convention,173 and as such cannot be used to justify de-
cisions regarding bail conditions. The absence of proper guidance for a
statutory discretionary bail power was held by the European Court in
Gatt v Malta to be incompatible with Article 5(1)(b) on the grounds
that the unguided exercise of the power could lead to arbitrary and
disproportionate results.174
Furthermore, with such a wide discretionary power it is not
surprising that the police may impose conditions that, in themselves,
curtail a range of Convention rights.175 Thus it is possible that an indi-
vidual be made subject to police bail conditions that are sufficiently
restrictive of their liberty to amount to a deprivation under Article 5
169 Bail Act 1976, s. 3(6) and PACE 1984, s. 30A(3B) are almost identical in this respect. Conditions
may be imposed if they are necessary to secure that the suspect surrenders to custody, does not
commit an offence whilst on bail, does not interfere with witnesses or otherwise obstruct the course
of justice, or necessary for his own protection or, in the case of a suspect under the age of 17, for his
own welfare or in his own interests.
170 In the same way that magistrates do. See R v.Mansfield Justices, ex parte Sharkey [1985] 1 All ER
193. Hucklesby (note 163 above, at 261) noted that magistrates’ courts can impose an infinite
variety of bail conditions. This is true of police bail as well, the police enjoying virtually the same
powers.
171 See the discussion in the Law Commission, Bail and the Human Rights Act 1998 (Law ComNo 269
HC 7, 2001) [9B-15] – [9B-18].
172 For example, Home Office Circulars 61/2002, 61/2003 and 021/2007.
173 Khan v. United Kingdom [2000] ECHR 35394/97, at [25]–[28].
174 Gatt v. Malta [2010] ECHR 28221/08, at [49].
175 We do not know what conditions the police, in general, impose as this information is not collected
or, indeed, monitored centrally.
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ECHR.176 Curfews, for example, have the potential to infringe
Article 5.177 A curfew can shade into house arrest, becoming in effect
more restrictive than an open prison.178 Where someone is subject to a
curfew that lasts longer than sixteen hours a day they are in effect
imprisoned.179 It is interesting, in passing, to contrast the position of
suspects on police bail with those on court bail. Where an individual is
remanded on bail by a court, the time spent subject to a curfew can be
taken into account when discounting any sentence imposed following
conviction.180 No such considerations apply in the case of police bail.
Where a person is suspected of domestic violence the police may
well impose bail conditions that prevent the suspect from staying at
his home address or indeed visiting the family home.181 There may, of
course, be good reasons for such ancillary conditions. However, any
such conditions are a serious interference with the right to a home life
as guaranteed by Article 8 and should not lightly be imposed on an
individual who has not been found guilty of an offence and indeed is
presumed to be innocent. Yet the Home Office/ACPO Guidance on the
Safer Detention and Handling of Persons in Police Custody states that
such conditions should be considered automatically in cases of alleged
domestic violence.182
There is nothing in domestic law to prevent the police from im-
posing association restrictions as a form of summary punishment
which, as Raine and Wilson argue, is something that is done by
magistrates’ courts.183 For instance, members of the campaign group
“Global Rush” were arrested for gluing themselves together in
Parliament as a form of protest. Group members were subsequently
bailed by the police with the condition that they did not “directly or
indirectly” communicate with each other.184 Such police bail conditions
176 For example, many of the Belmarsh detainees were freed on conditional bail following the decision
of the House of Lords in A v. Home Secretary [2004] UKHL 56. Those conditions were in effect
identical to the control orders later imposed on the terrorist suspects. See C. Walker, “Keeping
Control of Terrorists without Losing Control of Constitutionalism” (2006–2007) 59 Stan. L. Rev.
1395, 1410.
177 Each case inevitably turns on its own facts: “To determine whether a person is deprived of his or
her liberty the Court must look upon the actual circumstances of the regime to which he or she was
subject, as a matter of law and in fact” (Pekov v. Bulgaria [2006] ECHR 50358/99, at [73]).
178 Secretary of State for the Home Department v. JJ [2007] UKHL 45 [2008] 1 AC 385, [103] (Lord
Brown).
179 Note 177 above, [105], (Lord Brown) and [61] (Lady Hale).
180 CJA 2003 s. 240A. A “qualifying curfew condition” is defined as “a condition of bail which
requires the person granted bail to remain at one or more specified places for a total of not less
than 9 hours in any given day”. The defendant must be electronically tagged: R v. Barrett [2009]
All E.R. (D) 40 (Sep); R v. Girma [2009] EWCA Crim 912, at [95]. For discounts before s. 240A
came into force see R v. Glover [2008] EWCA Crim 1782, at [14] (Hughes L.J.).
181 See model conditions in Home Office and ACPO Guidance on the Safer Detention and Handling of
Persons in Police Custody (2006), 171.
182 Note 180 above.
183 Raine and Wilson, note 162 above, pp. 258–259.
184 Baroness Miller of Chilthorne Domer, Policing and Crime Bill, HC Deb. vol. 713 col. 579 (20 Oct
2009)., and see P. Lewis, “Lawyers to fight bail conditions that ‘stifle’ climate protests”,
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clearly have the potential to interfere unjustifiably with political rights
and freedoms guaranteed by Articles 10 and 11 ECHR. Furthermore,
the availability of street bail powers means that officers policing un-
popular demonstrations now have a new low level discretionary power
that effectively enables them to disperse and control demonstrators in a
draconian way with little oversight.185
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Police powers to impose bail, conditional or unconditional, on people
who have not been charged with a criminal offence suffer from con-
siderable and serious procedural deficiencies. The suspect has no, or
limited, right to be given information as to why bail or bail conditions
are considered to be necessary, and has no right to make any re-
presentations regarding either bail or conditions. Even if they are able
to make representations, the officer making the decision is under no
obligation to take them into account. There are very few limitations
on the conditions that can be imposed, and no special provisions for
juveniles or other vulnerable suspects. Conditional bail is not limited by
reference to the seriousness of the suspected offence, and there is
no time limit on the period for which bail can be imposed. Judicial
involvement is limited to varying or removing conditions, does not
in practice extend to the decision to bail itself, and is available only
at the instance of the suspect. As a result, in terms of procedural justice,
a suspect who has not been charged with a criminal offence is at a
significant disadvantage compared to a person who has.
We have argued that these powers fail to meet the requirements of
Article 5 and, in particular, Article 5(3) ECHR. The Convention re-
quires that following arrest a person must promptly be brought before
a judge or other judicial officer. Whilst Article 5 does embrace the
notion of conditional release, this is only at the instance of a judge or
judicial officer. A police officer cannot be a judicial officer for this
purpose, and the police are not absolved from the obligation of prompt
production by granting them bail. The purpose of the requirement
of prompt production is not only so that a decision about release
may be made, but also to enable the legality (which would include the
proportionality) of the arrest to be judicially reviewed. Even if the
provisions do not, per se, breach Convention rights then their use in
The Guardian 3 May 2009, available at www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/may/03/climate-
rush-protesters-bail-challenge. They were also prohibited from being any closer to Parliament than
one kilometre.
185 See a discussion of this problem with respect to Terrorism Act 2000, ss. 44 and 45, powers in
R. Edwards, “Stop and Search, Terrorism and the Human Rights Deficit” (2008) 37 C.L.W.R.
211, 221–222. In Gillan the ECtHR declined to examine the application under Articles 10 and 11
having held that there was an infringement under Article 8 ECHR.
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particular circumstances may amount to a breach of rights under
Articles 8, 10 or 11 and, in either case, their use may be discriminatory
contrary to Article 14. The prospects of successful challenge in respect
of the latter is fundamentally undermined by the failure to require the
routine collection of police bail statistics.
It could be legitimate for the police to bail an arrested person who
has not been charged provided that the prompt production provisions
of Article 5(3) are complied with. In this way police bail could return to
its original purpose, namely that of liberating the individual pending
imminent judicial process. One way of doing so would be to provide
that where bail is granted, whether or not conditional, for a period
exceeding four days186 the case is automatically referred to a magis-
trates’ court for review. The court would have powers to consider the
legality of the arrest (and thus ensure compliance with Article 5(1)(c)
and (3)), the need for bail (as opposed to unconditional release), and
the necessity of the conditions. In doing so, the court would be required
to consider whether both bail, and bail conditions, are proportionate
given the seriousness of the offence under investigation. Such a pro-
cedure would be more difficult to apply in the case of street bail, but
there are strong arguments for abolition of street bail. It appears that
the police are not generally well disposed to street bail, especially with
conditions, and it is difficult to justify arresting officers having such
powers.
As we have demonstrated, police powers to bail persons who
have not been charged with a criminal offence are by no means new.
However, the development of the police role in the investigation of
crime, with the consequence change in the role of arrest, together
with the relatively new powers to impose conditions, has substantially
altered the nature of these powers. The police now have extensive
powers to control and supervise people who have not been found guilty
of any offence. Those powers are subject to limited judicial oversight
and, in the absence of evidence as to their use, limited public account-
ability. It is surely time for them to be fundamentally re-assessed.
186 See Brogan and others v. United Kingdom (1989) 11 EHRR 117.
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